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No one credibly disputes that Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) were the victims 
of genocide during the war of the early-90’s. This status is however 
currently being used against them by their own ethnic political elite. 
Former State-President Haris Silajdzic has shamelessly adopted the 
‘political pose of victimhood’1 to further his own political agenda to the 
detriment of those who genuinely deserve support and recognition. 
Silajdzic has led the evolution of a post-war Bosniak identity based solely 
upon this victim-status. In terms of post-war state-building and conflict-
transformation progress is not just obstructed but entirely paralysed by the 
hostile dynamic inherent in the absolute categories of victim:perpetrator. 
If identity is premised solely upon victimhood then not only will a reduction 
in perceived external threat jeopardise group solidarity but the identity 
itself will be endangered by reconciliation with the persecutor. Such a 
stance therefore precludes the possibility of engagement with the 
allegedly still ‘sociocidal’2 Serbs on even unrelated issues leading to 
political deadlock and socio-economic stagnation.  Not only has the 
continued abuse of Bosnia’s people by their own political elite resulted in 
diminished life-chances for all ethnic groups; so too has international 
silence on the issue led to a situation of conflict-exacerbation instead of 
transformation in the last decade.  I intend to describe the process and 
motivation behind this political exploitation of victimhood in post-war 
Bosnia, analyse its most pertinent consequences, and discuss the options 
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It is important to make two things clear from the outset of this paper – 
firstly that no attempt is being made to deny that Bosniaks were the 
victims of genocide during the war of the early-90’s. Adequate truths 
have been unearthed, often literally, and are now supported by several 
judicial findings3 to render this fact beyond dispute. Leaving aside for now 
discussion of the specific finding of genocide, the majority of individual 
atrocities in the Bosnian war were committed against those deemed to 
be by their attackers: Bosniak. Secondly, the topic under discussion is the 
politicisation of victimhood not it’s political use per se. Politics is one of the 
many forums where valid claims of victimhood and requests for redress 
must be made. I will attempt to distinguish between the legitimate search 
for justice however, and the political masquerade being perpetrated by 
certain political elites in post-war Bosnia. This is vital since alignment with a 
questionable political agenda allows detractors to question the integrity 
of the real victims’ ongoing pursuit of justice. Furthermore the political 
manipulation of victimhood is itself contributing to continued injustice 
since the political deadlock it causes paralyses progress thus diminishing 
life-chances for all ethnic groups.  
 
This paper is derived from a larger study of the evolution of ethno-
nationalism in post-war Bosnia. It is clear, sixteen-years post-war, that 
stubborn ideological barriers to communication obstruct peacebuilding 
more so than physical minefields. It is widely acknowledged4 that leaders 
such as Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman exploited the suffering, 
real or mythical, of their constituents to consolidate & mobilise them for 
their wartime aims. Identity-transformation strategies: strategies which 
focus on changing the players, not just the rules of the game have 
however been largely neglected by the post-war international presence 
in BiH. Identity is intransigent but not immutable. The fact that international 
peacemakers are the only group neglecting to engage with it post-war 
means the mutual antagonism of ethno-national identities there has been 
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allowed to metastasize. I will describe the process and motivation behind 
this political exploitation of victimhood in post-war Bosnia, analyse its most 





The ‘Choice’ of a Victim Identity 
 
Bosniaks began decrying political/territorial gains made by violence 
during the war on the early 1990’s5. This was both morally legitimate and 
an understandable attempt to counter attempts by Serb and 
international powers alike to impute moral equivalence to the conflict 
parties and therefore forestall intervention6. This same dynamic has 
however carried over into the post-war era and lends a misleading moral 
clarity to the actions of certain political elites, primarily the Stranka za 
Bosnia-Hercegovina (SBiH – The Party for Bosnia-Hercegovina) and its 
leader Haris Silajdzic. 
 
Traditionally the least cohesive, and most contested of communities in 
Bosnia during the war the Bosniaks sought a foci for identity as the 
guardians of the country’s multi-ethnicity. This attempt at magnanimity 
only survived the conflict in the form of sporadic veneers and 
inconsistently enforced quotas delineated by the Dayton Peace 
Agreement (DPA). Bosniak political parties now appeal to Bosniak voters 
and Bosniak voters have been engaged in a search for a core identity. 
Religious confession is a distinguisher insofar as Serbs are predominantly 
Orthodox, and Croats largely Catholic, although both rely on historical 
and pseudo-historical markers to fill-out their identities. However Bosniaks 
are not only massively varied in their level of devotion to Islam but, 
receiving little aid from Islamic countries during the war, are highly 
sceptical of attempts to import foreign strains of the religion in the post-
war period.  
 
The Israeli historian Saul Friedländer wrote in 1987 of ‘the growing centrality 
of the Shoah for Jewish communities in the Diaspora and that "The Shoah 
is almost becoming a symbol of identification, for better or for worse, 
whether because of the weakening of the bond of religion or because of 
the lesser salience of Zionism and Israel as an identification element’7. Such 
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a dynamic, albeit deliberately exaggerated, is currently in evidence in post-war 
BiH. As a result an identity has been propagated by Bosniak power elites 
centred around victimhood – leading to the arguably unique irony of 
‘...Moslem leaders comparing themselves to Jews…’8. Indeed Silajdzic has 
drawn repeated and explicit parallels between the Jewish experience at 
Auschwitz-Birkenau and that of Bosniaks at Srebrenica, in addition to 
tacitly comparing Serbs to Nazis9. Furthermore and of central significance 
to the current political deadlock is Silajdzic’s frequent description, since 
the 2007 International Court of Justice verdict10, of the Republika Srpska as 
the product of genocide and/or ‘sociocide’11. I would contend that the 
significance of the repeated emphasis oF the term ‘genocide’, as 
opposed to ‘crimes against humanity’ or ‘war crimes’ is that there is an 
element of overarching political direction and therefore responsibility 
implied in the definition of genocide. Silajdzic has used this in an attempt 
to render the guilty party’s political status forfeit.  While qualitatively 
individuals suffer just as obscenely when victims of crimes against 
humanity as with genocide, the former legal category is frankly not so 
politically expedient.  
 
Like the majority of political parties in post-war Bosnia, the SBiH is 
essentially a vehicle for the promotion of its leaders’ personal agenda. 
With increasing stridence since its foundation the party has campaigned 
to abolish the system designated in the DPA in favour of a centralised 
state without the entities of the Republika Srpska or the Federation. 
Despite ongoing political roadblocks preventing a post-war census, it is 
possible that Bosniaks now comprise not just a plurality but outright 
majority in post-war Bosnia. As a result many, on all sides, view Silajdzic’s 
cries for ‘one-man, one-vote’ not as a genuine move to reunify a multi-
ethnic country or even naïve posturing but a blatant attempt to establish 
ethnic dominance12.  It may be argued that, as the recent victims of 
genocide a desire for political control amongst Bosniaks is more defensive 
than offensive. However this is not a constitutional system that has ever, or 
will ever, work in Bosnia and the suggestion thereof puts ethnic Serbs and 
Croats permanently on the defensive.  
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Silajdzic used opposition to the 2006 ‘April Package’ of Constitutional 
Reforms, claiming they legitimised the RS, thereby ‘legalising genocide’13 
to successfully re-launch his political career. His party now seeks to parlay 
the 2007 ICJ verdict into a retroactive legal reason for the dissolution of 
the Dayton-mandated Republika Srpska. This is based upon a legally 
dubious interpretation of the International Law Commission’s Articles of 
States’ Responsibility, adopted by the UN in 2001, that ‘No state shall 
recognise as lawful a situation created by a serious breach of a 
[peremptory norm of international law]’14.   
 
Explaining Silajdzic’s Choice 
 
Forefather of nationalism theory Ernest Renan observed that ‘suffering in 
common unites people more than joy. In national memories, laments are 
worth more than triumphs...’15. Indeed such are the cohesive powers of 
shared suffering that it is unsurprising that Bosniak politicians have sought 
recourse to it in order to ensure a receptive and united constituency post-
war.  While this is undoubtedly part of this discourse’s use by politicians in 
the SDA such as Suleijman Tihic, it does not entirely explain the SBiH’s 
actions. Former Bosnian High Representative Paddy Ashdown speculates 
that Silajdzic is ‘deeply damaged’ by the government which he was part 
of abandoning the safe haven of Srebrenica and is acting partially 
therefore out of guilt16.  However there are far more numerous and far less 
worthy explanations for Silajdzic’s recent actions than a desire for 
expiation.  Considering the fact that he has ‘no record of achievement’17 
since becoming a member of the state presidency for helping his 
constituents, I would suggest these motives are far more accurate. 
 
Adoption of the ‘political pose’ of victimhood has clear strategic benefits. 
First amongst these is its effectiveness in silencing intra-ethnic critique of 
Silajdzic’s actions; as independent journalist Tihomir Loza observes: ‘…how 
exactly do you question someone promising to undo Srebrenica’s 
tragedy? You just don’t?’18  Former Deputy-High Representative Graham 
Day similarly notes parallels with the Israeli public relations book: ‘you 
cannot criticize me I represent the voice of the holocaust’19.  Political 
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moderate and one of the few ethnic Serbs to be awarded a Golden Lily 
for his service in the Bosnian army, Slavisa Sucur summarises this situation: 
‘Creating the sense that the whole ethnic group is a collective victim 
basically is a justification to do whatever you want... I strongly believe that 
the guilt should be individualised, and the victimhood should be 
individualised. The problem with fascism rising is one side has said ‘we are 
the victims’ – no there are people who were victims. You are not the 
victims – you were nobody before the war and now you have this and 
that and so do people around you. You are not victims but there are 
many people who are.’20 
 
Similar vicarious attributions of stoicism, purity and strength for surviving at 
all may also be imputed. All of which ultimately elevate the victim group 
above bystanders and perpetrators even further; whether personally 
deserved or simply claimed as an effect of group membership. As 
American-Jewish journalist Ian Baruma admitted: ‘I am not the child of 
Holocaust survivors. My mother was Jewish, but she lived in England, and 
no immediate relations were killed by the Nazis. And yet even I couldn’t 
escape a momentary feeling of vicarious virtue, especially when I came 
across tourists from Germany.’21  
 
Furthermore a reduction of the restraining impact of normative standards 
on the victimised group is noted by philosopher Gareth Williams as in a 
world which allowed such atrocity to occur there is perceived to be ‘no 
meaningful prospect of outside accountability...’ and ‘Where 
accountability fails, responsibility across time is all too likely to fail.’22 Little 
effective oversight of the group’s actions is possible if no-one is perceived 
as untainted enough to judge them. As Hannah Arendt warned: ‘We are 
simply not equipped to deal, on a human, political level, with a guilt that 
is beyond crime and an innocence that is beyond goodness or virtue...’23. 
In the political arena such claims to absolute purity effectively removes 
one from the same sphere as those interlocutors required in mundane 
governance. This effect has even been observed to be trans-
generational, further attenuating the claim. ‘The innocence and 
vulnerability that characterize the Holocaust victim also characterises 
modern Jews. Such an identity demands the presence of a Jewish state 
(to protect the Jews) but also justifies the actions of the state as righteous 
because they are being carried out by such a ‘pure’ people...’24. 
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It is both a positive and understandable move for Bosniaks to seek to 
define themselves more clearly post-war considering the extent to which 
they suffered from the negative ascriptions of others during the conflict. 
The direction that the SBiH has led them in in this regard however is not 
contributing to individual life chances beyond those of a small political 
clique, and in its appropriation by a political agenda obstructing the real 
search for justice. The most significant harm inflicted by this political 
manipulation of victimhood however is that the elites depending on this 
platform for the continuance of their power arguably have a vested 
interest in the continuing persecution of their own people. In Haris 
Silajdzic’s case arguably his constituent’s continued suffering is in his best 
interests since it allows him to…‘exploit his injury to excuse his failures’25. 
Indeed it is acknowledged by international legal experts that genocide 
and other conflicts are sometimes used ‘…to direct political pressure and 
public attention away from leaders’ unable to meet minimum 
commitments.’26 It is possible that the SBiH is one of the few to attempt 
such political sleight-of-hand when on the receiving-end of such abuses 
 
The SBiH members have been termed Foteljasi by critics meaning 
‘armchair’ politicians – concerned solely with their own comfort and 
enrichment27. Anecdotally too barbed paraphrases of the SBiH’s 2006 
election slogan ‘100% BiH’ have entered pop culture; from commentators 
describing the party’s performance as ‘Haris 100% neceg Silajdzic’ (100% 
Nothing) and graffiti of ‘Haris 100% Izdaja’ (100% Betrayal) decorating the 
walls of Sarajevo. 
 
Lastly Silajdzic’s specific focus on Srebrenica is equally strategic and not 
only, or even primarily, directed at his domestic audience. ‘The self-
assigned status as the victim does not necessarily indicate weakness. On 
the contrary, it provides strength vis-à-vis the international community, 
which usually tends to support the vicitimised side...’28. Srebrenica was the 
site of horrific violence during the war but frankly so too were many other 
towns around Bosnia and the Krajina. What makes Srebrenica useful is its 
status as the shibboleth of all international failings in BiH. A deserved 
degree of guilt elicited by its name coupled with a tacit anti-Republika 
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Srpska prejudice stemming from the acts of the war has kept the 
international community silent during Silajdzic’s increasingly strident anti-
entity pronouncements thereby heightening inter-ethnic tensions in-
country to their current level.  
 
The Republika Srpska and its political overlord Milorad Dodik have 
received their fair, and sometimes unfair, share of condemnation for 
acting contrary to the DPA. This distracts from the fact that, as far as calls 
for territorial revanchism are concerned, the Bosniak political elite are 
arguably now just as culpable. Whether through war-spawned guilt or a 
conscious refusal to criticise one of the US-brokered Washington 
Agreement’s offspring the Bosnian Muslim political elite are remarkably un-
censured. This apparent bias exacerbates a further consequence of the 
political adoption of a victimhood persona. While it may be a position 
with significant ethico-political leverage attached it also lends itself to an 
inherent passivity on the part of the Bosniaks. The SBiH clearly feel that the 
onus is on an indicted international community to rectify the current 
situation. Not only is such an attitude at odds with the requirements of 
post-war rebuilding but so too is it massively unrealistic based upon the 
international community’s increasingly desperate search for an exit 
strategy in BiH. 
 
The Implications of the Political Manipulation of Victimhood 
 
Former-Knesset member Avraham Burg opined recently that his native 
Israel has become ‘a nation of victims, and our state religion the worship 
and tending of traumas…’29 In the Bosnian context Silajdzic’s worship of 
trauma has several consequences, all are negative. Indeed activist and 
vice-president of the non-nationalist party Nasa Stranka Maja Marjanovic 
notes that in post-war Bosnia the only people benefiting from this 
deadlocked status quo are the political elites who instigated it: ‘If we look 
at the elections of 2006 – it is amazing how the big parties played-off each 
other and secured votes...But when it translates into the everyday lives of 
everyday people – it’s a catastrophe’30.  
 
As regards issues of transitional justice, the political co-optation of 
victimhood effectively gives would-be opponents an imperative to 
undermine such claims. Whilst admittedly such claims may well be viewed 
as legitimate political targets even without comprising the sole platform of 
a competitor, they are guaranteed to be challenged if they are. In Bosnia 
this has resulted in the increasing extremism of Silajdzic’s main antagonist 
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Milorad Dodik to the point of genocide-denial. ‘We cannot and will never 
accept qualifying that event [Srebrenica] as a genocide...’.31 Dodik has 
also asked for a ‘recount’ of the reported number of victims of this 
massacre, despite the original report actually being produced by his own 
entity in 200432. The extent to which such repellent moves are made in 
response to Silajdzic’s provocation is impossible to quantify precisely but 
arguably the posture of a key rival is likely to be a significant motivation for 
any political action. While Milorad Dodik is one of the most nimble of 
politicians in BiH today, and may very well see Silajdzic’s pose for what it is, 
the risk is of course that few others will see through their leader’s sophistry. 
 
Furthermore, although always a salient issue in post-war Bosnia, the 
heightened rhetoric since Silajdzic’s 2006 election to the state presidency 
has intensified the ongoing absurd but damaging necrowar regarding 
who can ‘boast’ the highest number of wartime victims.  Kada Hotic, vice-
president of the Mothers of Srebrenica Association noted the irony that 
nationalist politicians, despite professing to protect their own people, are 
usually fairly pleased if they can claim to have incurred the greatest 
ethnic body-count33. This has heightened the defensiveness of the already 
suspicious Serbs to the point where Dragan Cavic, former RS-president 
who laudably apologised for Srebrenica in 2004 lamented that in the 
‘current climate it seemed like he had spoken in 2024 not 2004.’ 34 Indeed, 
should Silajdzic’s successor Bakir Izetbegovic not relinquish this discourse 
then the potential contribution to peacebuilding that the upcoming 
Karadzic and Mladic verdicts may have is likely to suffer by association 
with an regressive political agenda. 
 
In addition to this detrimental impact on the general discourse of 
transitional justice the political manipulation of victimhood has little 
realistic prospect of righting the wrongs of genocide. Silajdzic’s legalistic 
attempts to push the international community to abolish the entity system, 
(a move which incidentally would remove the minimal protection the 
Croat minority receives as part of the joint Croat-Bosniak Federation) are 
utterly futile. The international community, even at its most united, has 
never in post-war Bosnia shown the inclination to flex its muscles to that 
degree. Indeed, as mention previously, in the past five years the primary 
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concern of all but European Union member states has been to depart. 
The EU itself is also proving reticent on major constitutional reform 
requirements for Bosnia’s accession, apparently hoping the impetus for 
such changes will come from domestic sources. 
 
In terms of domestic post-war state-building progress is not just obstructed 
but entirely paralysed by the hostile dynamic inherent in the absolute 
categories of victim: perpetrator. For example so ingrained in the political 
and identity narrative of Israel has its victimhood become that even 
contemporary political acts such as a moratorium on further settlements 
are interpreted through this prism and felt as a further Shoah-related 
injury35. If identity is premised solely upon victimhood then not only will a 
reduction in perceived external threat jeopardise group-solidarity but the 
identity itself will be fundamentally ‘imperilled by reconciliation with the 
persecutor.’36 Such a stance therefore precludes the possibility of 
engagement with the allegedly still ‘sociocidal’37 Serbs on even unrelated 
issues.  This political limbo has led to stalled social and economic 
development a fact which may further exacerbate ethnic distance if 
attributed to other ethnic groups rather than one’s own leaders ‘...the 
more people suffered, the more they assigned collective guilt to the 
group perceived as being responsible for their suffering.’38  
 
Something which must also be monitored is the troubling paradox 
sometimes observed amongst those who view themselves as victims 
displaying a subsequent tendency to victimise others. Serbia, Israel, and 
the US after September 11th are only the most obvious examples39. While 
the Bosniak are not at this stage yet the effect that the constant repetition 
of passivity, of being acted upon or done to can have on reducing 
perceived personal responsibility needs considered. If a status created by 
someone else is a central part of identity then almost any guilty act on the 
victims’ part can be projected upon to the initial aggressor, effectively 
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saying: ‘look what they have made us into’40.  There is the possibility that 
this logic could trigger further cycles of violence. Fears of repeated 
persecution also possess an inherent dynamic: hostility is anticipated and, 
if absent, projected and then used to affirm pre-emptive strikes. For 
example: Arab opposition to Jewish settlement in Palestine was not based 
on anti-Semitism yet ‘...blindness to this was one large cause of the failure 




The adoption of the political pose of victimhood is clearly politically 
expedient but ultimately socially paralysing. In December 2008 Suleiman 
Tihic, the only major political party leader who was personally the victim of 
serious war crimes called on his fellow Bosniaks to abjure ‘the philosophy 
of victimhood and self-pity’42.  This cry to reclaim a sense of personal 
agency; perhaps to challenge the ascription of an identity either by those 
who committed violent acts or political leaders who have exploited and 
therefore compounded this must be considered. Occupying the position 
of eternal victim effectively puts the power, this time of apology, in the 
hands of those perceived as wrong-doers. Perhaps in becoming an active 
forgiver of others rather than waiting for a, possibly permanently withheld, 
apology would be a more positive identity for Bosniaks struggling to 
situate themselves in post-war Bosnia. If however it is in their leaders’ 
interest to keep them perpetually labelled as victims then Bosniaks may 
never receive adequate support to come to terms with their survival; their 
empowerment and the reconstruction of their self-esteem appears 
counter to the interests of those supposed to represent them. 
 
It is worth asking if the political elite who have consciously cultivated this 
pose of victimhood have actually led their own people into an 
ideological cul-de-sac where the only way of healing their own pain is by 
relinquishing their ethnic identity – one of the few things which has 
survived the war. Have Haris Silajdzic and the SBiH effectively imprisoned 
Bosniaks between a place of suffering or extinction in a way that Karadzic, 
Milosevic and Tudjman never managed? 
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Some  Possible Options 
 
One pathway is found in the strategy of a relatively new party. Nasa 
Stranka (‘Our Party’) describe themselves as ‘post-ideological’ in that their 
platform is social justice, however they do not attempt to claim they live in 
a post-nationalist or a-nationalist community, or ask members to relinquish 
strongly held identities. They simply state that identity politics are not 
actually relevant to the improvement of life-chances in post-war Bosnia43. 
Holding that the majority of the population’s interests are neither one-
dimensional nor fundamentally opposed44, NS believe that the key to 
changing the political status quo in Bosnia depends upon emphasising 
commonality of interest not difference of identity. This approach arguably 
displaces ethno-nationalism from the political arena, rather than seeking 
to transform its content per se. However considering the current situation 
this would be a massive improvement.  
 
Depoliticising identity in Bosnia will not be easy – as NS’s relatively weak 
electoral performance to-date indicates - yet it is feasible. Indeed Daniel 
Byman, concurs that ‘Identity change policies can bypass group status 
concerns by appealing directly to individuals who compose the group.’45  
There is certainly a constituency for such an approach: a 2009 UNDP 
survey found that fewer than 25% of respondents state-wide believed that 
only ethno-nationalist political parties could protect their interests46. 
Simultaneously 76% of those polled across the country reported high levels 
of pride in belonging to their ethnic group47. This may indicate that NS’s 
strategy of not minimising identity just highlighting its irrelevance to most 
significant issues such as pensions, employment, healthcare and 
education could find support.   
 
In lieu of domestic leaders who eschew such ideological manipulation, or 
a robust civil society to lobby for justice outside the central political arena 
what can be done? The onus  falls on the international community to 
accept that neither their tribunal nor the elections they have sponsored 
                                                 
43
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are adequate to create peace BiH, indeed both tainted by the games 
being played on-the-ground.   
Indeed the structural, elite-focused approach that has been employed is 
the standard operating procedure of the post-WWII international 
community, but it has been criticised by the school of conflict 
transformation for being inadequate to entrench sustainable peace and 
for being readily undermined by its neglect of social and cultural 
reconstruction48.  Johan Galtung included for the first time the psycho-
social elements of conflict, arguing that these are as significant as the 
more objective components, and that conflict transformation must 
involve all levels of society not only the elite49.  
 
Considering the continued problems with the institutional-ideological 
interaction encountered by the international presence in Bosnia there are 
reasons to ask if the adoption of a more transformative approach, 
specifically one that minimises the influence of power-elites or weakens 
their ideological armoury, would have fared better. Firstly, these elites 
have, through daily political practice in Bosnia, been a powerful post-war 
hindrance to peace. Neither the elite-bargaining imperative of the 
consociational model nor the centripetal incentives of the integrative 
approach have managed to produce the desired moderation in the 
stance of domestic political elites. Secondly, conflict transformation theory 
indicates that failure to engage with the underlying causes of conflict will 
mean that relationships are unlikely to be sufficiently transformed to 
embed peace50. Indeed we have seen that, left unmoderated, 
relationships can be manipulated post-war to actually exacerbate the 
conflict. 
 
Unfortunately beyond cosmetic dabbling with flags, licence plates and 
mute national anthems the international community has undertaken no 
process akin to the symbolic and ideological denazification of WWII or the 
disestablishment of Japanese Shintoism and its nationalist constellations51. 
Indeed ‘Bosnian’ is not even an identity-category recognised in state 
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legal documents52 leaving no choice but to subscribe to one ethnic 
group for any political participation. Considering the conditions extant in 
1995, it may have been impossible to find an alternative starting point to 
Dayton’s ethno-nationalist fiefdoms53. But the current impasse may have 
been avoided through a subsequent consistency in at least one element 
of the international approach: Accept the centrality of ethno-nationalism 
in the conflict but then undertake some degree of ideological 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in the post-war era. Events 
since 1995, and most clearly since 2006, indicate that un-reconstructed 
ethno-nationalist ideology jeopardises any progress made.  
 
Van Evera, although more sceptical than Kalyvas, notes that while 
wholesale transformation is implausible in a post-conflict context it might 
be possible to minimise the malignancy of certain identities.  ‘Serbs will be 
Serbs and Croats will be Croats. Neither will assimilate to being something 
else. But Serb and Croat nationalism can be tempered into something 
more benign.’ 54 How then could such a reformation be undertaken?  
 
While it is an imperfect solution the much-debated yet never-actualised 
Bosnian Truth Commission may be a means to expose some of the 
instrumentalism surrounding ethno-nationalist discourse in Bosnia.  It would 
also obviate the need for the international community to effectively 
weigh-in on nationalist ideology something they are apparently 
uncomfortable with. Furthermore the degree to which the international 
community would have to be directly involved in a truth commission is not 
necessarily proportionate to the benefit it may gain in terms of stability 
and the achievement of an exit-option. The academic debate 
surrounding ‘peace versus justice’ tends to view truth commissions and 
criminal trials as largely exclusive55. However, if the structural and psycho-
social must both be considered in post-war conflict-regulation strategies 
then such distinctions may have to be overcome.  While the international 
community both instituted the Hague tribunal and sponsored domestic 
hybrid war crimes trials, the third-party imposition of truth commissions is 
rare. 
 
As one of the key problems encountered in post-war Bosnia is the reliance 
of elected politicians on mutually hostile ethno-nationalisms then 
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removing or at least minimising the role of these elected officials may 
perhaps also prove beneficial. The extension of international supervision 
and election moratoriums are not a new suggestions, indeed this was 
successfully attempted for sometime in Brcko56. However the OHR Head of 
Political Affairs, and longest-serving international official in Bosnia, Archie 
Tuta admits it was never considered countrywide due to an international 
aversion to accusations of imperialism57. Tuta views this aversion as 
regrettable considering the measures the international community had to 
eventually adopt anyway to deal with nationalist obstruction, noting we 
should have been ‘braver, sooner’58. Similarly political advisor to the 
European Commission Delegation Elisabeth Tomasinac admits that 
perpetually avoiding engagement with ethno-nationalists has effectively 
stored-up trouble for a time when the international presence is exhausted 
and the EU unwilling to provide a suitably muscular replacement59 . 
Potential political cover for postponing elections may be found in the fact 
that it is now widely agreed that the immediate period after the signing of 
the DPA was devoted to physical reconstruction rather than state-
building60 and there was therefore little for elected politicians to do other 
than consolidate nationalist enclaves.   
 
Ultimately, although only taking the Bosniaks as an example herein, the 
changes in ethno-nationalist identity in the post-war period are such that 
we must consider the international non-intervention therein a failure. 
Unrestrained these ideologies have been used to perpetuate ethnic 
power cliques to the detriment of the general populace and international 
attempts at peacebuilding. Whether this will prompt a change in 
international behaviour is unknown, but it would seem that without some 
amelioration of ethno-nationalism, Bosnia faces a miserable future. 
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